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A B S T R A C T
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand have large river deltas. The ﬁrst three deltas have international
commitments for so-called delta plans: large-scale national eﬀorts to reshape deltas in light of future economic
growth and climate change. Thailand’s Chao Phraya delta has no such commitments. Why is this the case? This
article proposes that Thailand’s absence of a colonial past has retained a diﬀerently ordered institutional ca-
pacity and that Delta plans embed assumptions that ﬁt poorly with a Thai worldview. The article relies on
literature and adds original research collected on three separate ﬁeld visits to Thailand.
1. Four impressive deltas in South and Southeast Asia
The Himalayas and their Eastern extending mountain ranges give
birth to major rivers in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Some end in impressive deltas. In Bangladesh, the Ganges, the
Brahmaputra, and the Meghna make the country into one large delta,
its distributaries woven into the Bay of Bengal. In Myanmar, the un-
tamed meandering branches of the Ayeryawaddy traverse rural lands to
meet the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. In Vietnam, the Mekong
ﬂows through the Nine Dragon heads into the South Chinese Sea. And
in Thailand, the Chao Phraya, carved left and right by man-made ca-
nals, enters the Gulf of Thailand passing through the capital Bangkok.1
Delta plans—or plans to formulate delta plans—exist for three out of
these four countries. Such Delta plans root in Dutch experience.
Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Vietnam all have ongoing delta planning
processes involving the Dutch government, Dutch knowledge institutes
and Dutch engineering companies, preceded by eﬀorts to create de-
mand by the Dutch government and its water industry, building on
existing, longstanding relations.2 In Vietnam, the Dutch contributed to
the Mekong delta plan (Zegwaard, 2016). In Bangladesh, the Dutch
have worked on a variety of eﬀorts, including the Bangladesh 2100
delta plan. And in Myanmar, the Dutch government, research institutes
and private sector operators have fostered their ties with the World
Bank and the Burmese government in the capital Nay Pyi Taw to con-
tribute to a delta strategy for the Ayeryawaddy.3
And in Thailand? The Chao Phraya delta (located in the Bangkok
and Samut Prakan provinces) has all the threats of a delta, from
ﬂooding, salinization, land subsidence, erosion, droughts, to vulner-
ability to climate change and population increase.4 Yet the Chao Phraya
has no delta plan, despite the eﬀorts of the Dutch.5 The embassy
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1 The scholar Yoshikazu Takaya documented the Chao Phraya delta with great care. His introduction to Agricultural Development of the Tropical Delta: Study of
the Chao Phraya Delta (1987) concludes with a nice thought. When the Indian subcontinent ‘crashed’ into Asia, mountain ranges rose and cracks appeared. Those
cracks give us the paths of the main rivers of South and Southeast Asia. Takaya speculates that the Chao Phraya river was once much longer. The contemporary short
path is a remnant from a more majestic river (Takaya, 1987). A mud brown, species rich river, running from a hilly north to the ﬂat plains towards the Gulf of
Thailand.
2 Interview Deltares, March 2017
3 Interview World Bank, November 2017
4 A major 2011 ﬂood in Bangkok, for example, spurred the development of an integrated city-wide masterplan (cut short by a 2014 military coup). Our interviews
suggest that Bangkok, and not the delta is the relevant object for planning. This in contrast, for instance, to the Ayeryawaddy delta, which is an administrative unit of
Myanmar from British times onwards, where British institutions were fostered to integrate Myanmar’s Ayeryawaddy delta into the global economy (Adas, 2011).
5 Interviews with Dutch experts suggest that both the Dutch government and Dutch engineering companies have struggled to sell water expertise to Thai gov-
ernments (interviews Dutch Embassy Thailand and Arcadis Thailand, October 2016, March/April 2017). The Dutch had their hopes of selling knowledge for large
scale projects in Thailand after losing a tender to Koreans in 2011. In 2017, the Dutch Government has stopped supporting the Dutch embassy in Thailand for limited
export of water knowledge. A water mission of Dutch experts failed to set up business contracts. (interviews Embassy October 2016; Arcadis October 2016 &
November 2017; interview KWater March 2017).
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organized water missions and engineering companies and knowledge
institutes lobbied Thai governmental actors.6 At the turn of the 20th
century, the Dutch irrigation engineer Homan van der Heide devised a
plan for the Chao Phraya delta and became the ﬁrst director of the
Royal Irrigation Department (ten Brummelhuis, 2005), and in the
1950s, the Dutch participated in World Bank-funded consortia for dam
constructions (Sangkhamanee, 2018). And so, like in neighboring
countries, ties and precedent existed.
Our question for this article is: what explains this lack of a Dutch
delta plan in Thailand, and what does this say about knowledge- and
policy-transfer?
Explanations readily suggest themselves. First, the absence of a
delta plan in Thailand might be coincidental: Bangladesh, Myanmar,
and Vietnam do have a delta plan; Thailand does not. And that is all
there is to it. Other types of plans, techniques, tools and skills do ‘travel’
to Thailand: the 20th century brought infrastructure, banking, tele-
communications; the 21st makes Bangkok a global hub in knowledge
exchange (Baldwin, 2017). Our ﬁeldwork reveals that in water and
climate governance as well, Thailand is well connected. A random
outcome is then our null hypothesis and the rest of this article consists
of arguments weighing against it. Importantly, in using historical ac-
counts explaining present outcomes, causality will not be settled, and
we have no such pretension. After all, history does not repeat, and there
are never enough comparable cases to show non-spurious regularities.
Nevertheless, reasoning can improve by exploring diﬀerent possible
explanations. The article relies on literature and adds original research
collected on three separate ﬁeld visits to Thailand.7
A second reason (and a building block in this article) is that
Thailand retained independence in history. But independence by itself
explains little and should not be an impediment, and moreover, it fails
to explain why Thailand does take in other travelling knowledge. A
third reason—one we also subscribe to but argue is incomplete—is that
Thailand lacks the political or economic incentives of its neighbors.
Indeed, for a Thai-Dutch engineer aiding the Dutch embassy to promote
the Dutch water agenda, the case is clear (and we ‘shouldn’t overthink
it’): ‘it’s really, really simple: we don’t give money, as we do in
Myanmar. Why would the Thai government accept?’8 To be sure,
Bangladesh has long been a ‘donor darling’. In Myanmar, cyclone
Nargis in the delta opened the country to foreign aid in 2008. And when
Thailand was a developing country, it could receive World Bank loans
conditional on ‘structural adjustment’. And today, Thailand, still clas-
siﬁed as a developing country, is an upper-middle-income economy,
providing its own technical assistance to neighboring countries.
Nevertheless, the economic explanation can only partially explain.9
Incentives explain how reluctance—a threshold—is overcome. It does
not explain what constitutes the threshold. What could inhibit Delta
plans to travel?10
First, in Thailand, a continuous institutional development produced
distinct policy-making practices. And second, we posit that delta plans
are incongruent with these practices at the level of worldviews. Next,
we thus describe a longue durée history of some Thai institutional ele-
ments. Then, we explore a worldview behind delta plans and explore
points of incongruence with the proposed Thai worldview.
2. Historically settled institutional elements within the Chao
Phraya delta
All Southeast Asian ‘ﬁrst-millennium polities share close historical
links with the region’s contemporary nation-states’, most of all in
Thailand (Stark, 2006). Where does the germ of Thai institutions start
and what are its distinctive elements? Takaya (1973) views Thai in-
stitutions as a series of best responses to river-related problems in the
Chao Phraya river system, its history dividing into three periods: the
city polis starting in the mountainous North in early Medieval times,
then migrating South to the overwhelming ﬂoods of the river basin
during the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, and then ﬁnally settling down in the
previously inhospitable delta, transformed, under the guidance of the
Bangkok Kings, into a rice bowl serving the city (Takaya, 1973).11 Aside
from responses to ecological challenges, we argue technocratic cultures
would also have had to develop alongside Buddhism, the city-state, and
kingship.
Buddhism, and with it writing systems and concepts of political
organization, entered Southeast Asia via interregional trade networks.
Buddhism arrived ﬁrst in Myanmar and moved to Thailand with the
Mon people, who settled the Dvaravati system of chiefdoms, a direct
precursor to contemporary Thai kingship. Buddhism was not the only
religious inﬂuence on institutions: the ﬁrst century A.D. saw Hindu
migrants enter, replacing a kin-ordered system with a hierarchical po-
litical-economic system (Murphy and Stark, 2016). Later, the ‘Chinese’
Tai people12 replaced the Mon,13 while the Dvaravati chiefdom became
the Lavo kingdom, retaining a Buddhist cosmology and hierarchical
political arrangement.14 Indian traders and monks then brought Pali
and Sanskrit scripts, facilitating the diﬀusion of Buddhist views. Today,
above 90 per cent of the people of Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar
are practicing Theravada Buddhists.15 Unlike Cambodia and Myanmar,
Thailand continues ﬁtting Buddhism to otherwise secular, but self-re-
formed political institutions.
2.1. City-states
Life in Southeast Asia was organized around city-states, ruled by
Kings (Dellios, 2003; Embree, 1950). Cities—and Kings—ruled
across territories with decaying, sometimes overlapping radiuses of
inﬂuence, measured by tributes paid16 (Winichakul, 1994, Aryan,
6 Interview Dutch embassy in Thailand and Arcadis Bangkok in October
2016; follow up personal correspondence with water expert at Arcadis, April
2017.
7 This research consisted of interviews with Thai water management practi-
tioners in Bangkok and Ayutthaya, in October 2016, January 2017, and March-
April 2017. Separate interviews were held in the Netherlands with Dutch delta
planners and with practitioners in Myanmar and Vietnam. From the interviews
vignettes are generated to provide support for the argument.
8 Personal correspondence with water expert, April 2017.
9 Economic incentive also fails to explain why Bangkok-centered Korean
plans did travel after the 2011 disaster, consisting of tangible present ﬁxes in
infrastructure (Interview K-Water, April 2017), despite the disaster ﬂooding
most of the basin and delta.
10We do not imply that travel to the other Southeast Asian countries is easy.
Many of the same problems arise that arise in Thailand. And there are idio-
syncratic diﬃculties as well. In Myanmar, for example, the government in the
capital Nay Pi Taw has had little capacity to make even the basic planning
arrangements that are needed according to the World Bank. The closing of the
(footnote continued)
country’s technical universities at the end of the Cold War means that delta
plans have had little data to support projections. Interview World Bank,
November 2017.
11 The most prominent water governance institution, the Royal Irrigation
Department, indeed was a continuation of the Ayutthaya ministries for irriga-
tion and ﬂood management, dating back to the 14th century (Takaya, 1987).
12 Coming from Guangxi province in China (8th-10th century CE).
13 Also replacing the Brahmic language and script. The current dominant
language in the Chao Phraya is still the tonal language Thai, or Siamese. The
Siamese language is a member of the Tai group and the Tai-Kadai language
family.
14 Historical sources and genetic evidence do not suﬃce to determine how
continuous the two kingdoms were.
15Most young men, for example, spend time in a monastery to improve their
chances of marriage.
16 In the Mandala political system power was indivisible. The King was an
absolute monarch. Delegating power to others implied a loss of power. Power
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200417). Ayutthaya, in what is now Thailand, was a prominent city,
continuing the Lavo political order for another four centuries.18 Ayut-
thaya sat at the North end of the Chao Phraya delta on a strategic point
of the river for controlled trade and entry, attaining global signiﬁcance.
The city absorbed foreign ideas through a permeable yet resisting elite-
barrier (Evers, 1987). Foreigners were numerous, as chronicles on
trade, taxes, and marriages indicate, though trade with Westerners was
tightly controlled (Baker et al., 2005). Ayutthaya’s Kings oversaw the
digging of canals for transport and ﬂood and drought management. The
city’s civil servants were sophisticated administrators with high literacy
rates (Khanittanan, 2001).
Then the Burmese sacked Ayutthaya in 1767. The city ruined, the
Royal seat moved South to a trading post in the delta, now incorporated
into Bangkok. The new Buddhist Kingdom of Siam remained city based,
transferring its elite administered mode of managing foreign trade (and
ideas), and transforming the Chao Phraya delta to suit the King-ruled,
trade-oriented city of Bangkok (Takaya, 1973). Today, infrastructural
mega-plans on governing water in the delta organize around the city,
from the King’s dyke to a master plan cut short by the 2014 political
coup, to a large system of drainage tunnels.
2.2. Kingship
History brought Buddhist and Hindu inﬂuence to present-day Thai
kingship. Buddhist kingship emphasizes keeping the peace between
people; Hindu kingship emphasizes maintaining the order of things
(Xing, 2011; Aryan, 2004). Yet kingship is attached to the waters as
well. Ayutthaya Kings depended on the river and so did Bangkok’s
Kings. Canal-building projects in transforming the delta were a royal
enterprise, for which Kings sometimes enlisted Western engineers and
investors (Takaya 1987).19 King Rama IX (1927–2016) (or Bhumibol
Adulyadej) ascended the throne in 1947 and reigned until his passing
alongside Thailand’s economic development. Like his predecessors, the
Rama IX enjoys a semi-religious reverence.20 Portraits still adorn public
spaces and buildings and his persona is associated with the rise of the
Thai nation-state. Hence, although Thailand vacillates between demo-
cratic and autocratic systems of governing, the King remains an in-
stitutional force of stability21 including in governing water. The King,
for example, stimulated the building of hydro dams and ﬂood man-
agement infrastructure along the Chao Phraya river. Propaganda ma-
terial emphasized the active presence of a King with rolled-up sleeves
and mud-stained boots bringing in the Northern, non-deltaic territories
into the nation-state.22 Within Thailand’s national development, water
governance around the Chao Phraya river system was a focus area.
Rama IX had an estimated fortune of 28 billion dollars. Rama IX used
part of this money to stimulate water management projects from a
Buddhist-inspired worldview (Handley, 2006), on which more later.
2.3. Independence from imperialism
Siam was never part of a European empire. It evaded the fate of its
neighbors, who experienced imposed institutional reforms and post-
colonial reactions. As a result, currents of Buddhism, the city-state, and
kingship persist within the institutional fabric, despite Thailand also
being a secular nation-state, ruled by alternating democratic and au-
tocratic regimes.23
The rest of South and Southeast Asia experienced Western Powers
translating foreign religious, scientiﬁc and classical liberal ideas into
institutions (Bayly 2002). After 1757, the British dominated Bengal.
From 1824, the British ruled the Burmese. From 1858 on, the French
settled ‘Indochine’ (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam).24 In Bangladesh,
Vietnam and Myanmar,25 educational and administrative institutions
were reformed to ﬁt with the colonizing country’s interests and nor-
mative agendas, while sui generis elements such as kingship, religious
practices and patronage networks were either abolished or disturbed
and altered (Bayly 2002). In Bangladesh, Islam was kept outside gov-
erning, and after independence, Muslims activists cooperated with ac-
tivists with post-colonial ideologies (Novak, 1993). In Vietnam, where
pre-colonial times exhibited well-developed, but now ‘lost modernities’
(Woodside, 2006), the religious strands of Taoism, Confucianism and
Buddhism adjusted to a Communist bureaucracy that did not respect a
separation between State and religion (Scigliano, 1964). In Myanmar,
Buddhism is an even stronger force in the conceptualization of daily life
than in Thailand and it still pervades political thought (Walton, 2017).
Burmese institutions were ﬁrst reshaped in the image and to the pur-
poses of the British. In post-colonial times, institutions were reshaped to
the purposes of ﬁrst a ‘non-aligned’ parliamentary democracy, then by
the purposes of a (paranoid) military regime (Myint-U 2006), and
today, in response to the normative agendas of foreign and interna-
tional institutions, including in water governance (Hogendoorn et al.,
2018). Buddhist views were kept outside government, hardened in re-
sponse to unsuccessful Christian religious missions (Bayly 2002), and
took on a political role versus the military (Walton, 2017).
Siam, however, managed to stay independent, a buﬀer between
Imperial giants, reforming its institutions with more autonomy
(Winichakul, 1994). Throughout the colonial era, the Siamese elite
(footnote continued)
was framed as a zero sum game, stimulating the formation of relevant norms in
such games. This institutionalized frame made for strong Kings and intense
power struggles, a settled dynamic which we see to this day and will play a role
in our argument. Within the Southeast Asian city-state system, power did decay
in a radius, when moving away from the polis or by being inaccessible. Decay of
power meant that cities had overlapping spheres of inﬂuence. Areas could pay
tribute to diﬀerent cities at once.
17 Aryan: ‘It can be asserted that, in the pre-modern time or before the 20th
century, the Kingdom was not a single political organization under a uniﬁed
authority. In fact, it comprised of the most powerful township, the capital, and a
number of other major and minor townships with varying degrees of autonomy.
In times of peace each township ran its own aﬀairs and paid tribute: minor
townships paid tribute to major ones and all did so to the most powerful.
Because of geographical barriers and communication diﬃculty, the capital
could exercise the direct rule only over an area within a radius of, say, two days
of traveling.’ (Aryan, 2004, p.2)
18 Brought there by the legendary U Thong. U Thong was long thought to be
a family member of Chinese merchants.
19 Even today, royal traditions persist of choreographed displays of cere-
monial riverboats, paying homage to the linkage between royalty and the Chao
Phraya river.
20 Lèse-majesté laws prevent public criticism by imposing long jail sentences.
21 Rama IX was a skilled navigator amidst this turmoil; the election com-
missioner Gothan Aryan said: ‘King Bhumibol assured the continuity of mon-
archy by maintaining it above the competition between elite within the military
and bureaucracy and between them and non-bureaucrat elite. The King coop-
erated with the winning sides and ﬁnally when democratic force seems to
(footnote continued)
prevail, the monarchy is credited for assuring the stability for this emergence,
proving that constitutional monarchy promotes constitutional democracy.’
(Aryan, 2004, p.).
22 Such propaganda was still broadcast, for example on Bangkok’s main
airport, during the year of mourning upon the King’s passing.
23 Japan, an East Asian country that similarly maintained independence, also
has many Buddhists. Yet it is a minority with traditionally little connection to
state institutions, a history of militancy against native institutions, and of little
inﬂuence on the daily life of the average Japanese person. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to explore whether institutions in Japan still bear the traces of the
inﬂuential Shinto religion, and whether this provides misﬁts with travelling
concepts.
24 Taking land from the Thai in the 1893 Franco-Siamese war.
25 For example, in 2018 many Burmese elite engineers were above seventy
years of age, born in the British empire. Most were trained at the Delft technical
school in the Netherlands, near where delta plans also originate.
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retained ﬁrst a monopoly and then the lion’s share of the trade surplus.
It retained strong ideological inﬂuence and could choose to participate
in global trade. Evers (1987) notes: ‘the Siam economy seems much
further advanced than any other Southeast Asian economies at the time,
including the colonies.’ (Evers, 1987, p. 765).
Siam could not escape an inﬂuence from liberal global markets al-
together. In 1853, U.S. ‘gunboat diplomacy’ opened the Japanese
market. The British in Hong Kong meanwhile stirred the cauldron,
boiling over in the Opium Wars, destroying China, and removing
Thailand’s main trading partner. Reassessing Siamese prospects, the
Thai King Mongkut welcomed the British Governor of Hong Kong26
John Bowring with ceremonial pomp on the river. In the Bowring treaty
of 1855, King Mongkut agreed to end the Royal Storage (its adminis-
tered trade): non-royals could now trade with foreigners (Winichakul,
1994). The wane of China, the threat of power imbalance, improve-
ments in maritime technology, and a Thai competitive advantage over
the colonies made trade with Europeans attractive (Evers, 1987). The
loss of royal privilege was not the only institution to go. For example,
the Western version of a map gained inﬂuence, and changing a de-
caying radius of inﬂuence of city-states to a ﬁxed territory with hard
borders; through Western maps, Siam formed into a nation-state
(Winichakul, 1994). De facto, the city of Bangkok could remain the
schwerpunkt, supplied by a rural periphery.
Siam did modernize, absorbing pressure channeled by domestic
diplomats instead of abscising the past through imposed reforms chosen
by foreign bureaucrats. Thai elites chose to reform the education system
(delivering civil servants promoting Thai views) and changed an ab-
solute monarchy into a constitutional one in 1932. The Chao Phraya
delta too did transform. Canals ﬁrst increased from improved technol-
ogies and ﬁnancial speculations and roads did not exist (Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1983). After World War II, the U.S. became a military and
economic presence in Bangkok. Highways and skyscrapers paved over
the aquatic canal-based society, and with it, inﬂuenced how Thai
people conceived of living together (Jensen and Morita, 2017).27
In summary, the Thai have absorbed, even welcomed outside in-
ﬂuence; yet unlike its neighbors, Thailand maintained autonomy
(Winichakul, 1994; Bayly, 2004). Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Vietnam,
in contrast, saw their institutions replaced by 19th-century liberal
ideology and post-colonial reactions. The same institutional destruction
holds of course for Cambodia, the country of the Upper Mekong Delta,
which also is predominantly Buddhist.28 Change in Thailand preserved
Thai institutional continuities, including in technocratic institutions for
water governance. In the absence of incentives, any foreign idea would
need, we argue, congruence with a complex worldview performed in
these institutions.
2.3.1. A genealogy of Dutch delta plans
We propose Delta plans import assumptions ﬁtting poorly with the
elements of Thai institutions and worldviews outlined above. Delta
plans are very long-term Master plans for geophysical river deltas that
the Dutch government, Dutch research institutes and Dutch private
sector operators, such as globally operating engineering companies
have tried to sell across the world. Delta plans formed from concepts
rooted in meeting Dutch ﬂood management challenges in the delta of
the Rhine and the Meuse. When a delta plan travels to a target delta, it
leaves behind the Dutch environment, institutions, practices, and his-
torical intentions. Policymakers, knowledge institutes, diplomats and
engineering companies de-emphasize those diﬀerences and emphasize
features with overlap between deltaic regions (Zegwaard, 2016). Fo-
cusing on the overlap makes it easy to visualize how a well-performing
arrangement in the Netherlands should also work abroad. The simila-
rities aﬀord the Dutch to capitalize on their hard-won experience,
making a national identity into a signal of engineering-quality in the
competitive global water sector. Yet apart from the physical simila-
rities, the delta plans frame deltas as backward areas to ‘develop’ into
nation-states, taking into account long-term futures.
2.4. Nation-states
Delta plans have a Dutch pedigree. Delta plans imply a political
economy continuous with 19th-century progressive liberalism
(Bergsma, 2017). Hence, the concepts embedded in delta plans settled
not just in meeting past Dutch challenges of keeping water out, but from
a political project of developing backward regions in.29 Before the 20th
century, Dutch ﬂood management was mostly ad hoc and local, giving
rise to the hall-mark deliberative ‘polder-model’ of deliberation, and
before the 19th-century, the Netherlands consisted of trading city-states
within a republic of loose provinces.30 From the 19th-century onwards,
Dutch centralized policy-making practices in ﬂood management de-
veloped alongside the idea of a Dutch nation-state, and institutions
diﬀusing both ideas and their associated concepts accelerated after the
ﬂood disasters of 1916 and 1953, events catalyzing the formation of the
ﬁrst delta plans. After 1916, the ﬁrst delta plan closed the Dutch Zui-
derzee.31 After 1953, the megaprojects of the Delta Works transformed
the landscape of South Holland and Zeeland. The Zeeland plan signaled
the economic backwardness of ﬂood-prone regions and the national sig-
niﬁcance of disastrous storms and surge ﬂooding (De Pater, 2011;
Knippenberg, 1997).
2.5. Futures
After the Dutch delta plans were implemented, delta plans became
an abstracted, exportable type—a proﬁtable, applicable concept to
foreign deltas, focusing on economic growth, nation-building and vul-
nerability to climatic threats over long time frames.32 Delta plans
26 Bowring was also a political economist and a lifelong friend and former
employee of the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham.
27 For most of Thai history, the delta region itself was uninhabited for rea-
sons of climate. The dry spells in the monsoon climate made water storage
during heavy rainfall and ﬂooding imperative for agriculture. The delta was a
way of extending water ﬂows from the sea to far-ﬂung civilizations. This view
diﬀers from how, for example, the Dutch attend to their delta. Jensen and
Morita argue that for the Dutch, the delta is land ﬁrst, subject to land re-
clamation (Jensen and Morita 2017). That is certainly true today, though the
name of the delta province of Zeeland (Sealand) gives a diﬀerent signal.
28 Cambodia has not delta plan either, but here the reasons cannot be ex-
plained through the same logic.
29 Thailand, by contrast, dug canals in the Chao Phraya delta to let the sea in.
The delta was an extension of the sea, facilitating trade (Jensen and Morita
2017).
30 Formed into a loose Republic with placeholder rulers (or Stadthouders).
31 Notable here is that the Zuiderzee committee was headed by the physicist
Hendrik Lorentz. Faced with diﬃculties in ﬁguring out the enormous tidal
ﬂows, Lorentz managed to innovate the language and with it the mode of in-
ference from narrow empiricism to mathematically formal by inventing the
hydrodynamic equations of motion. These equations formed the basis of hy-
drological modeling. Not much later, the techno-scientiﬁc development con-
tinued in the setting up of the Delft Hydraulic lab, started by the human
computer of the Zuiderzee project, J. Th. Thijsse. And from this lab, mathe-
matical modeling later took shape, especially with its successor Deltares, one of
the driving organizations exporting Dutch delta plans.
32 In the Netherlands, ‘delta plans’ now seem to synonymous with any large-
scale government led problem-solving eﬀort, hoping to bask in the glory of the
original Delta plan of the mid-1950s. The 1990s already had its delta plan to
conserve ‘culture’ at a national level. In 2015, a delta plan for mathematics
education was set up. The delta plan as analogy is easily stretched. Houston,
after Hurricane Harvey, for instance, needed a ‘delta plan’, wrote Dutch hy-
draulic engineers (Zwam, 2017). Houston has no river delta. The term delta
itself provides an illustrative case for how language migrates through posing
analogies. For Herodotus, the Nile had a delta because its river mouth re-
sembled the triangle of the Greek letter delta. Over the centuries, this shape
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foreground uncertain, far-away futures, making use of projections of
demographics, economics, and more recently, climate science. For ex-
ample, scenario planning (a method in delta plans) focuses on the ‘ro-
bustness’ of decisions within a quadrant of good and bad economic and
climate futures.33 In scenario-planning, these conjectured scenarios
function as a best guess about the future, upon which strategic actions
can be selected. The variables in those scenarios can collect or create
data for any space or time-frame. This gives delta plans an aura of
universal appliance. Future-oriented delta plans thus ﬁt well with the
agendas circulating in global knowledge networks (Zegwaard, 2016),
evoking nation-building in poor and undeveloped areas and projecting
climate and economic scenarios over long time frames. Delta plans in
Thailand’s neighboring countries, for example, stimulate the following
inferences: deltas in Vietnam, Myanmar and Bangladesh are of national
importance and of future economic concern, and vulnerable to future
climate change. Taking delta plans as variable signals for inference, they
invariably emphasize desirable futures at the macro-level for a deﬁned,
deltaic territory.
3. Points of misﬁt between protestant-progressivism and Thai-
Buddhism
Our claim is that a worldview travelling along with delta plans sits
uneasily with the elements listed above. The main water governance
institutions and policymaking practices in both the Netherlands and
Thailand developed alongside distinct worldviews.
Robert Merton, the sociologist and historian of science, claimed
modern science rooted in Protestant values (Merton, 1938).34 Protes-
tants hoped to show a ﬁt between Faith and Reason, Merton argued,
resulting in improved methods of reasoning. Protestants also believed
fate was predestined. A select few would make Heaven in a distant
future of resurrection. The Protestant could study to ﬁnd clues in the
world on their own fate, and clues were made probable for those who
performed public deeds in line with reason. Sacriﬁcing time and eﬀort
for public beneﬁt with the use of reason, a devout Protestant avoided
the ‘master sin’: hedonic ‘ﬂesh pleasing’ and ‘idolatry’ (Merton, 1938, p.
425). Puritan ethos also favored mercantile proﬁts and reasoning with
applied capitalist uses, favoring the study of mathematics for ac-
counting and physics for engineering.35 Merton concludes: ‘We would
certainly be led to profound error were we to assume that religious
beliefs played the perfunctory role which is generally their lot today’
(Merton, 1938, p. 425). Historians have criticized the Puritan thesis for
its details (Morgan, 1979).36 Nevertheless, Protestantism favored the
idea of imagining and deterministic futures and applying expertise to
reach earthly, non-hedonic desirable futures.
The Netherlands’, for much of its institutional history as a republic
and then nation-state, was a Protestant country, though a sizeable part
of it was Catholic. The Dutch governmental institutions in which the
original delta plans were developed arose in formerly Protestant re-
gions. If we conjecture that history institutionalized a worldview in
Thailand, the same must be said for The Netherlands. The delta of the
Rhine and Meuse and around the ‘Zuiderzee’ were also ﬁrmly
Protestant. Not surprisingly, delta plans ﬁt well with the Protestant list
mentioned above. Delta planning, we propose, favors the following
order: seek clues for future possible states of the world (a gaze outward),
then help select for actions expected to bring about a subset of pub-
lically desired states. First, delta plans emphasize how methods of
reason can generate knowledge on distant futures (the fate of deltas) in
demographic, climatic change and macroeconomic terms, where people
in the delta-region cannot control these forces. Still, knowing how these
forces will impact the delta is useful, resulting in probabilistic and non-
probabilistic information on distant futures.37 And the way to ﬁnd clues
about the future is by starting public works with mercantile (Dutch)
private sector operators, using applied mathematics and physics. Cir-
culating delta plans are recipes for national and macro-level develop-
ment. Fast economic growth within a ﬁxed territory is something to
strive after. Debts incurred are repaid in a richer future, and whether
this is possible is made plausible to its planners by generating more
information.
The Thai worldview is organized diﬀerently, and apart from the
powerful city-focus making the developing delta-frame a poor ﬁt, the
contrast between Protestantism and Buddhism is illustrative. Buddhist
practice favors the following order in reasoning: subjective introspec-
tion and attending to disquiet, noticing whether one has good inten-
tions, and only then ﬁtting the right actions and thoughts with available
means. Attention explores tensions, resolved through relating and re-
arrangement. The notion of desired futures—core to Progressivist/
Protestant thought should misﬁt in particular. Like Christianity,
Buddhism comprises a varied set of traditions. The Thai and Burmese
variant of Theravada Buddhism, for instance, mixes with local animistic
practices (Manich Jumsai, 2000). Buddhism does have invariants.
Buddhism is, for one, a process philosophy. Things keep unfolding,
evolving, geometrically, but the notion of a single future end state is
foreign. Protestant predestination resembles the determinism of the
Hindu Wheel of Dharma. Buddhism, an oﬀshoot of Hinduism, is a de-
parture in this respect. In Buddhism, an escape from the Wheel is not
just a possibility, but an admirable aspiration, coming, in contrast to
Protestantism’s outward gaze, from a turn inward. Modern science ad-
dresses the objective, quantiﬁable, physical universe in order to gain
power over the natural world. Buddhism guides attention to subjective,
qualitative states of consciousness as a means to liberate the mind from
its aﬄictive tendencies and obscurations (Wallace, 2006). In Buddhism,
the future and desires play a diﬀerent role than in Protestantism.
Buddhism has a non-metaphysical attitude towards the future. Re-
garding desire, not just hedonism, but all desire is to be detached from.
The Buddhist monk works to quench desire and reach a future self of
Nirwana, and the common person satisﬁces to reach an unknowable
Karmic potential (Keyes et al., 1977). Buddhists focus on four logical
points (further speciﬁed in an 8-fold path): all is suﬀering, suﬀering
comes from desiring, desiring is a mental process, and desiring is un-
ceasing, never satisﬁed (Rahula, 2004). As a result, one plays the cards
one has been dealt; imagined futures foster desire. Thus, Buddhist
ethics implies cultivation by removing disquiet from one’s present ‘inter-
being’ (i.e. one only exists as a set of relations within a set of relations,
with no essence) (Priest, 2016).38
Epistemic pictures of futures and desired macro-states characterize
(footnote continued)
generalized to river mouths in general, whether they ﬁtted into a triangle or
not.
33 Interview Arcadis, October 2017
34 Earlier, in the Renaissance, more skeptical approaches to the study of God
had arisen (in the margin), with for example the Jesuit Francisco Sanches
concluding that God could be understood in a negative way—by subtracting
what he was not—and rejecting the syllogistic arguments of the Church. And
later Enlightenment thinkers credited with readying the mind for modern sci-
ence, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Gassendi and Bayle were no atheists (Bayle
was a Protestant).
35 To Merton’s list, we might add the Christian cultivation of individualism
(Dumont, 1985).
36 They have not challenged the existence of a relationship between orga-
nized (Christian) religion and the growth of science. Also Polkinghorne (2006),
sees causes of the growth of science in the Christian doctrine of creation and the
increasing reference in the 17th century to a ‘Book of Nature’ besides the Book
of Scripture.
37 Thinking about future uncertainty with rigor started in probability theory,
with a notable trajectory from Keynes in the 1920’s to Kolmogorov and Savage
in the 1950s.
38 Interview Theravada Buddhist Monks and scholars at the Dhamma Home
Buddhist study center in Bangkok, March 2017
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the nation-building of early Dutch delta plans and the climate cata-
strophe thinking in recent delta plans. Buddhism de-emphasizes ima-
gining epistemic pictures of futures, focuses on one’s inter-being and
capacity, and on detachment from all desire.
If present-day expertise intensive Delta plans ﬁt with Protestant
worldviews, do (some) present-day water governance arrangements in
Thailand ﬁt Buddhist views? To which we turn next.
4. The suﬃciency economy and the Hydro Agro Informatics
Institute
4.1. Suﬃciency economy
In the 20th century, the World Bank ‘restructured’ Thailand through
the National Social and Economic Development Plan. Thai agriculture,
governed since Medieval times, was forced in line with economic lib-
eralism, producing tensions and farmer-debts.39 These ‘structural ad-
justments’ and global market capitalismgenerally were increasingly
perceived as a corrosive inﬂuence on Thainess. In response, King Rama
IX formulated an alternative ideology for development. This Suﬃciency
Economy (SE) mixes Buddhism, development economics, and water
management policy (Dreschler, 2016a). The ﬁrst SE Royal project oc-
curred in 1951. By Rama IX’s death in 2016, SE totalled 4596 projects.
Instead of indebting others, the King used his charities and the Crown
Property Bureau to subsidize or ﬁnance developments (Handley,
2006).40 An easy conceptual ﬁt for Buddhist countries, the concept of
SE has travelled to other countries (Buthan, for example).41 The SE
precepts focus attention on the present. They address how to live within
one’s current means, whether one is a farmer or a national policymaker.
For example, SE inﬂuences the national agriculture agenda.42 The SE
precepts are normative, ﬁtting the actions of civilians, politicians, civil
servants and corporations to Buddhist principles, arguing not just
against limitless growth and greed and for self-reliance, but de-em-
phasizing the importance of futures altogether. The core guiding prin-
ciples in SE are moderation, understanding the consequences of actions
on one’s (social) environment (‘reasonableness’), and dealing with
personal risks (‘self-immunity’). One learns to act on these principles by
cultivating wisdom and virtue (Dreschler, 2016b). Striving outside
one’s current means or inter-being is bound to cause suﬀering.
SE manifests in diﬀerent policies and initiatives, from local village
level cooperatives based on self-generated discipline to national policies
(Handley, 2006). The SE is focused on a sustainable bootstrapping of
capacity, deducing back from intent (Dreschler, 2016b). An example of
a low-tech small scale delta ﬂood management project is given by the
so-called ‘Monkey Cheeks’. These retain water in times of ﬂooding for
use during drought. As such, Monkey Cheeks anticipate possibilities.
‘Monkey cheeks’ require no imagined far-ﬂung futures. Possible ex-
tremes of proximate local water levels will do. Just as other policies
taking place in rural cooperatives organized under the SE, they can be
classiﬁed as local, low-tech conceptual ﬁts. We will now discuss how
expertise-intensive institutions similarly can ﬁt with the Buddhist traits,
even if they do not link explicitly, as the rurally-oriented SE policies do.
4.2. HAII
Expertise-intensive governing builds capacity within pre-existing
and co-evolving institutions. Technocrats, to be sure, spend attention to
ensure eﬀective, ‘rational’ policies; yet such policies are also crafted to
ﬁt prevailing values and ideology: policy-making occurs within his-
torically grown, religiously and politically infused constraints. The best
example of a rigorous organization ﬁtting with the SE ideology is the
Hydro Agro Informatics Institute (HAII). After all, HAII was—osten-
sibly, at least— also Rama IX’s idea.
HAII consists of policy analysts working with complex data analysis
methods. Its main aim is to improve the fractured water governance of
Thailand, consisting of 26 organizations with unclear responsibilities
and little communication (Marks, 2016). HAII also works closely with
rural villages (stimulated by the King’s subsidies to organize in line with
the precepts of the Suﬃciency Economy), connecting databases and
mathematical formalisms to local knowledge. HAII is a network orga-
nization, improving, rearranging, and re-relating resources existing in
the present state. HAII originates in the mid-1990s, after one of Bang-
kok’s many ﬂoods. Rama IX shifted emphasis from a World Bank-loan
grey infrastructure response, current when political and economic in-
centives arguably crossed any threshold—to strengthening information
management within Thai ﬂood management as a governance system.
HAII was set up as a network hub and uses rigorous methods (for ex-
ample using combinatorics) in data-management.43 The (former) di-
rector of HAII, trained as a mathematician in combinatorics at the fa-
mous mathematical institute of ETH Zurich, disregarded climate
scenarios (from GCMs—global climate models—and RCMs—regional
climate models). For him, downscaled models of ensemble-based GCMs
generating virtual futures could not form a rigorous basis for decision
making.44
HAII focuses instead on improving existing, fractured data sets
39 ‘Some respondents argued that the reforms resulted in a large-scale agro-
industry focused on short term proﬁts at the cost of soil and the environment. It
also resulted in high levels of debt among farmers, with social ills as a result.
The focus on growth has led to a degradation of the soil through pesticide and
fertilizer use, and absurdities such as upstream hydro dams energizing air-
conditioned malls in Bangkok (Marks, 2016) or agro-industry clearing the up-
stream forests, resulting in exacerbated ﬂoods in Bangkok (interview former
chief engineering advisor to the Thai prime minister, April 2017). When in-
terviewing a Thai engineer of (judging by the name) an elite family on the eve
of the death of King Rama IX, it was not without strong emotion that a corrosive
inﬂuence on Thai society by ‘selling out’ to foreign interests was discussed
(interview Barames Vardhanabhuti on October 13th 2016 at Kasetsart Uni-
versity).
40 After the death of Rama IX, his son Maha Vajiralongkorn took the throne.
This transfer brought new uncertainty. Respondents attribute the Military’s
signiﬁcant changes in the constitution to it. Rama IX’s individual persona had
an aura of infallibility in the popular mind. Vajiralongkorn, by contrast, has a
scandal ridden past.
41 The experiences with the Suﬃciency Economy have not altogether been
successful. The failures occurred for economic and implementation reasons.
These development projects did not lead to large scale adoption for economic
reasons (Handley, 2006)
42 SE’s economic development strategy ﬁts E.F. Schumacher’s book Small is
Beautiful (Schumacher, 2010 [1973]). Schumacher distills his lessons learned
from German post-war development, put as a counterweight to seeing limitless
economic growth. Schumacher’s book was inspired by Burmese Buddhism
(Schumacher, 2010 [1973]). Rama IX himself translated the chapter on Bud-
dhist Economics.
43 HAII originates from a cooperation with the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). The story has it that since the King was born in Cambridge,
Massachusetts in 1927, the family maintained ties, and contacts were easily
forged. His father Mahidol Songkla, who is now regarded as the father of
modern medicine and public health in Thailand, studied at Harvard and MIT.
The King thus started the HAII. That is, the story as told by the former director
of HAII (interview HAII, April 2017). In Thailand, many positive and at times
incredible things are attributed to the King. Given this relentless hagiography,
whether the King initiated HAII or assumed that position, is unknowable. For
our argument it matters that the King and all involved claim this fact: as mutual
knowledge it provides an indication of what ﬁts.
44 Interview HAII director Royol Chitradon, April 2017. After, HAII – under a
new director - did join an international consortium emphasizing RCMs (HYP-
ERLINK \l "Ref19" \o "Hogendoorn et al., 2018 Hogendoorn, D.W.N., Soma-
villa-Croxatto, L., Petersen, Petersen, A. (2018) Who changes the delta? The
travels of water and climate governance expertise to Southeast Asian deltaic
regions through global knowledge networks. Manuscript in p" Hogendoorn
et al., 2018; et al., 2018)
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within its sphere of inﬂuence—its network of organizations. HAII’s po-
licies do ﬁt with the idea that an aim of action is to remove disquiet
within networks of associations (‘inter-being’). By requesting data sets
scattered within the fractured governance system, harmonizing them,
and feeding everything back into the system to further stimulate net-
work reciprocity, increasingly functioning as a hub. The removal of
disquiet and the view of reality as constituted as a set of networked
relations with no real nodes is a core Buddhist idea with its own rig-
orous logical implications (Priest, 2016). HAII’s emphasis on in-
tegrating and improving data instead of acquiring novel data is analo-
gous to subjective introspection and making use of present capacity,
and improving reciprocal ties between organizations by removing dis-
turbances. Its data reﬂects the present state of the Chao Phraya basin
and delta, anticipating locally tied possibilities, bootstrapping up in-
stead of macroplanning.45 HAII travels well in the region, expanding its
approach to 14 diﬀerent Hydro Informatics and Climate Data Centers
via its collaborations with ASEAN and the World Bank. HAII’s rigorous
policymaking ﬁts Buddhist worldviews.
5. Conclusions
Surrounded on all sides, one small delta of indomitable Thai still
holds out against the concept of the delta plan. We argued that this
absence was not a random outcome and can only partially be explained
by (a lack of) economic and political incentives. We singled out delta
plans to illustrate how incongruence between worldviews, performed in
institutions, might constitute a threshold inhibiting knowledge travel.
Delta plans signal fateful futures and foster desires, and bias attention
away from cities and towards nation-state building. Protestant and
Buddhist views diﬀer at least on these themes: the subject–object dis-
tinction, the orientation towards the future, the normative desirability
for proﬁts, and the notion of individual salvation. As we argued, delta
plans are not ‘Protestant’ (just as HAII is not Buddhist or an explicit part
of the Buddhist inspired Suﬃciency Economy). But delta plans, we
argued, do ﬁt with Progressivist-Protestant views. Delta plans infer to
action from constructed possible macro futures, with data used for in-
duction. Representations serve as information, as best guesses, to re-
duce choice on deltaic strategies. An ideal-typical Buddhist approach
would deduce right actions from inwardly consulted intent and avail-
able means, with little to no prominence for hypothetical futures. We
developed the possibility that the ﬁt (and the incongruence with Thai
worldviews) isnot coincidental. After all, professionals craft signs for
technocratic ends within broader societal patterns of association. In
Buddhism, imagining the future is irrelevant, even counterproductive
as it causes desire and with it suﬀering. Settling one’s intent ﬁrst, at-
tending to disquiet within one’s sphere of inﬂuence, and making use of
existing means are norms serving as goal-posts for inference and should
result in purposeful rearranging and re-relating of present resources. If
the possibility raised has merit, these Buddhist assumptions in a
Buddhist society should ﬁt better with some water governance in-
stitutions than others. We used the example of HAII to illustrate that
implicit and explicit ﬁts do exist in expertise-intensive arrangements.
Far from a cultural essentialist picture, we have provided an argument
on how diﬀerent and contingent, associations arising over time and
performed in patterned ways result in diﬃcult travels across.
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